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INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX IMMUNITY: DO WE
NEED A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT?
ROBERT C. BROWNtI

The recent decision of the federal Supreme Court in Graves
v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe1 is merely the culmination of a
series of decisions which have tended to limit or perhaps completely repudiate the doctrine of tax immunity as between the
two branches of our dual form of government. The decision is
that an officer of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, which is
concededly a wholly-owned federal government agency, may be
subjected to a non-discriminatory income tax by the state of his
residence, with respect to his salary from that corporation. Since
the immunity of federal income from state taxation established
nearly a hundred years ago by Dobbins v. The Commissioners
of Erie County2 is thus definitely given up, there can be no doubt
that the more doubtful and somewhat less ancient immunity
of state salaries from federal taxation given by Collector v. Day3
is likewise repudiated. Indeed both of these cases and also New
York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves,4 holding the general counsel of
the Panama Railroad exempt from state taxation on his salary,
on the ground that the railroad was a federal instrumentality,
are explicitly overruled. The decision in Brush v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue,5 holding the salary of a municipal officer
exempt from federal taxation, was also unfavorably commented
tA.B., Wesleyan University, 1914; LL.B., Harvard University, 1917;
J.S.D., 1930. Professor of Law, University of Indiana.
1. (1939) 306 U. S. 466. See also, State Tax Commission v. Van Cott
(1939) 306 U. S. 511.
2. (U. S. 1842) 16 Pet. 435.
3. (U. S. 1871) 11 Wall. 113.
4. (1937) 299 U. S. 401.
5. (1937) 300 U. S.352.
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on by Mr. Justice Stone who wrote the prevailing opinion in the
O'Keefe case; and it seems Mr. Justice Butler was correct in
stating in his dissenting opinion that it too must be deemed to
be overruled.
As-already said, the O'Keefe case represents the culmination
of a strong tendency during recent years to limit intergovernmental tax immunity, though with some interruptions, as in the
Rogers and Brush cases just mentioned.( Indeed Mr. Justice
Stone relied in that case particularly upon Helvering v. Gerhardt',7 decided a year before, which held that engineers of the
New York Port Authority were liable to federal income taxation.
It does seem that this case, notwithstanding its rather dubious
language, has actually gone the whole distance toward doing
away with intergovernmental tax immunity, at least so far as
salaries are concerned; but at least one state court refused to
accept this proposition, and held that the immunity of federal
state income taxation still applied after the Gerofficers from
8
hardt case.
Two other recent cases are worth mentioning as showing the
hostility of the Court toward intergovernmental tax immunity,
even preceding the O'Keefe case. These are James v. Draco Contracting Co.,9 holding that a state may impose a non-discriminatory tax on the gross receipts of a contractor from work within
the state, even though the work is done under a federal contract,
and all payments are made by the federal government; and
° holding that the
Helvering v. Mountain ProducersCorporation,1
lessee of state property is subject to a federal income tax on the
income from the operation of the leased property. Both of these
cases explicity overruled several previous decisions directly or
impliedly to the contrary.
It is necessary to give here a full resume of the scope and
history of intergovernmental tax immunity, especially since that
history seems now to have about reached its end. It originated
more than a century ago in the famous decision of Mr. Chief
6. See the annotation to the O'Keefe case in (1939) 120 A. L. R. 1477.
7. (1938) 304 U. S. 405.
8. Geery v. Minnesota Tax Commission (1938) 204 Minn. 107, 282 N. W.
673.
9. (1937) 302 U. S. 134.
10. (1938) 303 U. S. 376. See also, Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co. (1938)
303 U. S. 362.
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Justice Marshall in M'Culloch v. Maryland," where it was stated
12
as a matter of absolute reciprocal immunity from taxation.
This method of statement was extremely and sometimes unfortunately influential nearly up to the present, notwithstanding the
fact, as has often been pointed out, that the M'Culloch case involved a state tax definitely discriminatory against a federal
instrumentality, and therefore was correctly decided without the
necessity of enunciating any such general propositions as the
one here referred to. But this doctrinal immunity was given
definite application so far as income taxes were concerned in
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.,' 3 which invalidated the
federal income tax of 1894 as a whole, but particularly with
respect to income from state and municipal bonds, on the ground
that this was a direct burden upon the states and their instrumentalities and therefore unconstitutional. Later, it was held
that the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment had not removed
this immunity. 1'
The O'Keefe case has undoubtedly and avowedly changed the
law with respect to salaries and other compensation for personal
services; the previously existing immunity of state salaries from
federal taxation and federal salaries from state taxation is now
wholly done away with. The question remains whether the inmunity with respect to interest on bonds and other securities
is likewise ended. The Court expressly reserved this question,
and properly so, since it was not directly involved; but the statement of Mr. Justice Stone in his opinion that "The theory, which
once won a qualified approval, 15 that a tax on income is legally
or economically a tax on its source, is no longer tenable"' 8 would
11. (U. S. 1819) 4 Wheat. 316. See also Osborn v. United States (U. S.

1824) 9 Wheat. 738; Weston v. Charleston (U. S.1829) 2 Pet. 449.

12. The reasoning is largely based upon the announced proposition that
"the power to tax involves the power to destroy." This theory, often criticised, is definitely repudiated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring
opinion in the O'Keefe case.
13. (1895) 157 U. S. 429. On rehearing, reported in (1895) 158 U. S.
601, there was no further discussion of the problem of income from state
and municipal bonds.
14. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. R. (1916) 240 U. S. 1, holding that the
Sixteenth Amendment had not increased the scope of the federal power to

tax incomes, but had merely removed the necessity of apportionment of
income taxes according to population.
15. The reference is to such decisions as the Pollock case (1895)
U. S. 429, and (1895) 158 U. S.601.
16. (1936) 306 U. S.466, 480.
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seem to indicate that the Court would be prepared to repudiate
its opinion on this point in the Pollock case and hold that interest
on state and municipal bonds is subject to federal taxation, and
conversely, that interest on federal bonds is subject to state
taxation. The prevailing prediction of non-judicial authorities,
some before the O'Keefe case but reflecting the already apparent
disapproval of the Court of intergovernmental exemption, and
some after that decision, is in favor of the theory that intergovernmental exemption is gone with respect to bonds as well
as salaries;17 though there is some dispute.18 It must be confessed that such non-judicial authorities are distinctly unreliable,
but they are the best we have; furthermore, such changes of
judicial opinion as are discussed here indicate that reliance upon
court decisions is not entirely safe either.
The matter cannot be brought before the Court under present
conditions, at least so far as federal taxation is concerned, since
Congress has thus far refused to change the statute which expressly exempts from federal income tax interest on state and
municipal bonds.19 The opinion of this writer is of course of no
greater weight than that of any of the secondary authorities
previously cited; but that opinion, for what it is worth, is that
the Court is prepared to do away with intergovernmental tax
immunities with respect to interest as well as salaries. For one
thing, there is no logical or sensible ground for differentiating
between these two kinds of income at least for the present purpose; besides (and this is more important) the Court shows, by
the O'Keefe case, and its predecessors, that it regards the whole
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity as working badly
in encouraging the shirking of the burdens of government by
those best fitted to bear them. This latter argument applies even
more to the so-called tax-exempt bonds than it does to salaries.
17. The strongest argument for wholly doing away with intergovernmental tax immunity is Taxation of Government Bondholders and Employes; The Immunity Rule and the Sixteenth Amendment. This is a study
by the Federal Department of Justice published in 1938. See also, Shaw,
Recent Cases on the Doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax Immunity (1938)
8 Brooklyn L. Rev. 38; Hatton, Reciprocal Immunity of Federal and State
Instrumentalities (1939) 24 Bull. of Nat'l Tax Ass'n 146; Wenchel, Legal
Aspects of Tax-Exempt Privileges (1939) 25 A. B. A. J. 205.
18. See Wood, Taxation of Tax-Exempt Securities (1939) 25 A. B. A. J.
201; Nichols, Intergovernmental Tax Immunities (1939) 24 Bull. of Nat'l
Tax Ass'n 98.
19. See (1934) 48 Stat. 686, c. 277, 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 22 b (4).
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At any rate, the chances of the Court's sustaining such a tax
are so promising as to make it seem absurd to attempt to solve
the problem by the arduous method of a constitutional amendment. If this were all, a constitutional amendment would certainly be unnecessary. But before considering this problem,
the effect of the change of the Court's views as to other sorts
of taxes than income taxes, which have up to now been exclusively referred to, should be briefly considered.
EFFECT AS TO OTHER SORTS OF TAXES

Our whole dual form of government has some disadvantages
along with its undoubted advantages; and one of the disadvantages is the consequent complication and uncertainties which
result from the division of governmental authority. This is most
apparent and most troublesome with respect to taxation.20 Indeed the Court has pointed out that taxation immunities resulting from our dual form of government are of broader scope and
more rigidly applied than immunities of other sorts.21 For example, it held in United States v. Californi02 that a state which
operates a railroad engaged in interstate commerce is fully subject to the federal regulatory power with respect to the safety
of employees. The Court said:
The analogy of the constitutional immunity of state instrumentalities from federal taxation, on which respondent
relies, is not illuminating. That immunity is implied from
the nature of our federal system and the relationship within
it of state and national governments, and is equally a restriction on taxation by either of the instrumentalities of
the other. Its nature requires that it be so construed as to
allow to each government reasonable scope for its taxing
power, see Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 522524, which would be unduly curtailed if either by extending
its activities could withdraw from the taxing power of the
other subjects of taxation traditionally within it. [Citing
cases]. Hence we look to the activities in which the states
have traditionally engaged as marking the boundary of the
20. See Brown, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, and Federal and
State Taxation in Intergovernmental Relations-1932-1935 (1936) 24
Georgetown L. J. 584, and articles cited.
21. Federal Land Bank v. Priddy (1935) 295 U. S. 229, holding that the
express Congressional exemption of federal land banks from taxation did
not exempt them from liability to attachment. The Court remarked that
"Immunity of corporate government agencies from suit and judicial process,
and their incidents, is less readily implied than immunity from taxation."
22. (1936) 297 U. S. 175.
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restriction upon the federal taxing power. But there is no
such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce. The state can no more deny the power if its exercise
23
has been authorized by Congress than can an individual.
On the other hand, the Court has never, even in the days of
its greatest enthusiasm for intergovernmental immunity, held
that even tax immunity is absolute. It has generally been recognized as a practical problem, 24 with the immunity not extending
further than is necessary for the reasonable protection of the
continued existence and effectiveness of the states and nation
respectively; though, as will presently appear, this principle does
not always seem to have been properly applied in practice. Even
where the tax exemption has been regarded as clearly within
this doctrine, it has been recognized that it should not be carried
so far as to compel the taxing government to actually give a
2
bonus to the employees of bondholders of the other government. 1
As to sales taxes, there was even quite recently a tendency
to imply immunity in governmental relations with considerable
rigidity. Thus in Panhandle Oil Co. V. Mississippi,20 the Court
was divided, but the majority held that a state could not impose
a sales tax on gasoline sold to the federal government for use
by the Coast Guard and a government hospital. The minority
unsuccessfully argued that the burden upon the federal government was too remote and uncertain to justify the invalidation
of the tax. However, the doctrine of this case was followed as
late as 1936, when a state tax on the mere storing of gasoline
later sold to the United States, was invalidated on the same
27
basis.
As respects a federal sales tax upon products sold to the states
or their instrumentalities, the same doctrine seems to be applied,
though perhaps with a trifle less severity. In Indian Motorcycle
Co. v. United States, 28 a sale by the manufacturer of a motorcycle to a city, to be used by its police force, was held exempt
from federal excise tax, on the authority of the Panhandle Oil
23. 297 U. S. at 184-5.
24. Burnet v. Jergins Trust (1933) 288 U. S. 508.
25. See Brown, Reduction of Tax Exemptions by Reason of the Receipt
of Tax-Exempt Income (1932) 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 534.
26. (1928) 277 U. S. 218.
27. Graves v. Texas Co. (1936) 298 U. S. 393.
28. (1931) 283 U. S. 570.
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case. 29 But where the federal tax is on the manufacture 0 or
transportation 31 rather than on the sale itself, the tax is sustained, even though the sale is made to a state or its agencies,
on the ground that the tax is not directly upon the sale, and
the burden of the tax is primarily upon the seller rather than
on the purchasing state.
But all of these rather attenuated distinctions seem to dis-

appear with James v. Dravo Contracting Co. 3 2 In this case the

court upheld a state tax on the gross receipts of a contractor
holding a federal contract. While this may not strictly be a
sales tax, it is obviously at least equivalent, and constitutes a
direct burden upon the federal government-at least as direct
a burden as any sales tax could possibly impose. Indeed, the
Court conceded that the effect of the tax might well be to cause
the contractor to demand a higher fee. Yet this burden upon
the federal government was held not to invalidate the tax, so
long as it was non-discriminatory. It seems therefore that the
decisions invalidating state taxes upon sales to the federal government, or federal taxes on sales to a state government, can
no longer stand.
There has been a similar development with respect to the
problem of taxing agents and the like of the other member of
our dual system. Here the problem often involves income taxes;
but the point on which most of the decisions turn is the relation
of the person taxed to the government with which he is connected, rather than the nature of the tax; so this problem is
appropriately considered here. There does not seem to be any
doubt of the propriety of federal taxation of independent contractors with the state" or of state taxation of independent contractors with the federal government. 34 The Court has recognized that there is a possible burden upon the employing government in such a case, but regards it as too remote and attenuated
to justify the invalidation of the tax.
The difference between a tax on an independent contractor and
29. (1928) 277 U. S. 218.
30. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. United States (1937) 299 U. S. 383.
31. Wheeler Lumber, Bridge and Supply Co. v. United States (1930) 281
U. S. 572.
32. (1937) 302 U. S. 134.
33. Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell (1926) 269 U. S. 514.
34. Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean (1934) 291 U. S. 466;
James v. Dravo Contracting Co. (1937) 302 U. S. 134.
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a tax upon an agent seems to be one merely of degree. This is
not only because the distinction is by no means clear and definite
in legal theory, but even more because the burden of the tax
upon the employer of these two sorts of representatives is
actually not very different. Nevertheless, the Court was inclined to draw a sharp distinction between these two sorts of
cases, and to hold that a state tax upon a federal agent is invalid
as a direct burden upon the federal government, and this irrespective of the nature of the tax.35 The same rule undoubtedly
applies to federal taxes on state agents, 3 except as this rule may
be modified by the problem as to the nature of the function performed-a problem which will be considered later. If, however,
the activity taxed is paid from funds supplied by the taxing
government, 7 or the tax is a burden upon private interests rather
than the governmental unit whose agent is supposed to be taxed, 38
the tax will be sustained.
Here too the intergovernmental tax immunity had thus been
very greatly limited, even before the O'Keefe case. 39 Indeed, the
limitation is much greater than is here indicated, at least so far
as federal taxation is considered, because of the effect of state
functions assumed to be non-governmental as reducing the immunity. But whatever was left of this immunity seems definitely
wiped out by the O'Keefe case. That decision would seem to put
an end to all implied immunity of state agents from federal
taxation, and vice versa. So this problem also seems satisfactorily solved without any formal constitutional amendment.
Another problem which has caused considerable difficulty is
with respect to federal taxation of the lessees of state or municipal lands, and state taxation of lessees of land owned by the
federal government. Here too the income tax is often involved,
but again the problem is concerned less with the nature of the
tax than with the effect upon the lessor government.
35. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Texas (1881) 105 U. S. 460; Williams v.
Talladega (1912) 226 U. S. 404 (taxes on telegraph messages); Federal
Land Bank v. Crosland (1923) 261 U. S. 374; see also Pittman v. Home
Owners' Loan Corp. (1939) 60 S. Ct. 15 (mortgage recording taxes);
Claflam County v. United States (1923) 263 U. S. 341 (property tax).
36. See Helvering v. Therrell (1938) 303 U. S. 218.
37. Helvering v. Therrell (1938) 303 U. S. 218; Hanson v. Landy (D. C.
D. Minn. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 535.
38. Susquehanna Power Co. v. Maryland (1931) 283 U. S. 291; Fox
Film Corp. v. Doyal (1932) 286 U. S. 123.
39. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe (1939) 306 U. S. 466.
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Where federal lands are involved, the chief controversy appears to be with respect to Indian lands. As to such lands, the federal government is not usually the owner; but it may control the
lands, and have as to outsiders all the rights of an owner, but
solely for the purpose of protecting the Indians. Here, however,
the tendency is to liberalize the state taxing power as much as
possible, it being recognized that extensive exemption of Indian
lands from state taxation is undesirable from the standpoint of
the Indians themselves, and still more undesirable from the
standpoint of the welfare of the state.40 Indeed, several states
which have extensive Indian reservations within their borders
have been very definitely hampered in the use of their taxing
power by this situation; and accordingly, the Court has tended to
construe such exemptions very strictly, and especially as not
including lease interests or the products derived from such
lands."1 Nevertheless, it seems clear that express Congressional
language may completely exempt Indian property from state
42
taxation; and such statutes still occasionally appear.
On the other hand, the application of the federal income tax
to the lessees of state and municipal lands, originally quite restricted, has now become practically complete. This extension of
the taxing authority of the federal government was started by
construing mineral leases as essentially sales ;43 but it is now
clearly settled that true lessees of state and municipal lands are
fully subject to federal income or excise taxes with respect to
their operation of such land. 4 The Court has repudiated its previous theory that such a tax would be an improper burden upon
the state or its agency leasing the land, on the ground that such
a burden is too unsubstantial and problematical to justify wiping
out the federal taxing power. It may then be concluded that
the problem of intergovernmental immunity with respect to
leases is substantially solved, except possibly where Congress
40. See Brown, The Taxation of Indian Property (1931) 15 Minn. L.
Rev. 182.
41. Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Board of Equalization
(1933) 288 U. S. 325.
42. United States v. Board of Commissioners (D. C. N. D. Okla. 1939)
26 F. Supp. 270.
43. Group No. 1 Oil Corp. v. Bass (1931) 283 U. S. 279.
44. Burnet v. Jergins Trust (1933) 288 U. S. 508; Helvering v. Mountain
Producers Corp. (1938) 303 U. S. 376; Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co.
(1938) 303 U. S.362.
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claims immunity from state taxation by express language in the
statute, but that this solution has been reached without any
necessity of a constitutional amendment, and even without use
of the revolutionary doctrine of the O'Keefe case.
Finally we should consider briefly the problem of corporation
excise taxes, and the like. This is a problem largely, though not
exclusively, of the validity of state taxes. It also involves a sometimes troublesome determination of whether a particular state
tax is essentially an excise tax or a property tax upon the corporate franchise; but this last problem is not usually important,
so far as the validity of the tax in intergovernmental relations
is concerned.
One problem as to which there has been considerable litigation,
and some change of view by the Supreme Court, is as to the
necessity of a state making allowance in imposing such taxes for
holdings by the taxed corporation of federal securities. Without
hitherto questioning that such bonds or the interest therefrom
are wholly exempt from state taxation, the Court now seems committed to the proposition that no such allowance needs to be
made by the states, so that the tax may be computed without
reference to the fact that part of the corporate assets consisted
of such tax exempt bonds. 45 The same rule is applied even to
national banks, so long as the state tax does not exceed the limitations set by the federal statute' 6-a problem which will be
referred to later. On the other hand, the Court has insisted that
a property tax imposed by a state upon national banks must
make allowance for the federal bonds held by such bank, by
deducting their value from the property taxed. 7 The Court conceded that a franchise tax could be imposed without this allowance, and also that the economic effect of such a franchise tax
would be identical with a property tax, but insisted that "The
question here is one of power, and not of economics."
It seems, however, that this last doctrine should not be taken
too seriously. In the nearly forty years since the case above
referred to was decided, the Court has come to recognize that
the problem of taxation in intergovernmental relations is always
45. Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander (1902) 184 U. S. 111; Pacific Co. Ltd.
v. Johnson (1932) 285 U. S. 480, which in effect overrules The Macallen
Co. v. Massachusetts (1929) 279 U. S. 620.
46. Van Allen v. The Assessors (U. S. 1866) 3 Wall. 573.
47. Home Savings Bank v. Des Moines (1907) 205 U. S. 503.
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primarily one of economics. Furthermore, the states can always
avoid the effect of this doctrine, so far as it is still recognized,
merely by designating their tax as an excise rather than a
property tax.
Where federal bonds are not involved, no serious difficulties
seem to have arisen. The federal government can impose an
excise tax measured by income upon corporations formed under
state laws ;4 and the states may similarly tax income derived in
part from operation under federal privileges, 49 and may apparently actually impose a property tax upon at least some federal
franchises.so The problem of corporate excise and similar taxes
in governmental relations seems therefore essentially solved.
SITUATIONS WHICH ARE STILL UNSATISFACTORY
If the foregoing were all of the questions of intergovernmental
taxation, there would clearly be no need to consider a constitutional amendment. Most of these problems were solved without
the doctrine of the O'Keefe case; and that case has apparently
solved all the others. Such immunity as still exists, like the freedom from federal income tax of interest on state and municipal
bonds, is probably purely statutory, and can be readily ended by
action of Congress and the state legislatures.
Nevertheless, certain problems still exist, and may become
serious. They mostly concern federal taxation which might become unfairly retroactive, or worse still, might burden the states
without permitting a corresponding burden upon the federal
government, with the inevitable consequence of gradually strangling state governmental action or even existence. It is here, if
anywhere, that the necessity of further protection of the individual taxpayers but more primarily of the states may appear.
First as to retroactivity. It seems to be well-settled law that
claims for taxes are not subject to general statutes of limitations,
and that they are not barred by lapse of time, unless so provided
in the tax statute. 51
48. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. (1911) 220 U. S. 107. While the tax here
approved was essentially a corporate income tax, it was passed prior to
the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, and was therefore sustainable
only as an excise tax with respect to the corporate franchise.
49. Educational Films Corp. v. Ward (1931) 282 U. S. 379, holding that
a state income tax may properly include in its measure, royalties derived
from copyrights.
50. Central Pac. R. R. v. California (1896) 162 U. S. 91; but see, California v. Central Pac. R. R. (1888) 127 U. S. 1.
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On this theory, there would seem to be nothing to prevent
Congress from imposing an income tax retroactive to 191352 upon
salaries paid by states and their agencies, and presumably exempt
up to 1939. This would certainly be an intolerable burden, and
would popularly be regarded as a denial of due process, contrary to the Fifth Amendment. Nevertheless, the chance of sustaining a legal argument to this effect would not be particularly
promising. In the first place, all such salaries have always been
taxable-or so the Supreme Court has now decided in the O'Keefe
case. In the second place, a state income tax retroactive for more
than two years was sustained in the recent case of Welch v.
Henry,53 even though this kind of income was clearly non-taxable
when received. The Court in reaching this conclusion said,
If such changes are forbidden in the name of equal protection, legislatures in laying new taxes would be left powerless to rectify to any extent a previous distribution of tax
burdens which experience had shown to be inequitable, even
though constitutional."'
While this case involved the Fourteenth rather than the Fifth
Amendment, it may at least be said that the requirements of due
process with respect to the federal government are not more
stringent than those applicable to the states.
Mr. Justice Butler in his dissenting opinion in the O'Keefe
case clearly brought out this point by saying,
Thus now it appears that the United States has always
had power to tax salaries of state officers and employees and
that similarly free have been the States to tax salaries of
officers and employees of the United States. The compensation for past as well as for future service to be taxed and
the rates prescribed in the exertion of the newly disclosed
power depend on legislative discretion not subject to judicial
revision.5
It may be said that Congress has since the decision in the
O'Keefe case definitely removed this danger and shown its unwillingness to impose the tax retroactively by passing the "Public
Salary Tax Act of 1939," which imposes a federal income tax
upon state salaries only beginning January 1, 1939. Undoubtedly
51. See 3 Cooley, Taxation (4th ed. 1924) 2640, sec. 1338.
52. The date of the coming into effect of the Sixteenth Amendment.
53. (1938) 305 U. S. 134.
54. 305 U. S. at 145.
55.(1939) 306 U. S. 492, 493.
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this is a fair solution; but just as clearly it may be changed by
a later Congress. Nevertheless, it may perhaps be conceded that
the danger of this is not sufficient to justify undertaking the
burden necessarily involved in drafting a constitutional amendment and getting it adopted.
Not so satisfactory, however, is the situation with respect to
federal income tax upon interest on state and municipal bonds.
These have for more than a quarter of a century been regularly
issued as exempt from federal income tax. Furthermore the
statute so provided, and still so provides.56 Congress has been
urged to change the law, and sooner or later it probably willand probably should.
There is perhaps no serious danger that Congress will attempt
to impose a tax upon the interest already received from such
bonds. The excellent precedent of the statute with respect to
salaries will not improbably be followed. But if Congress should
do so, what has already been said makes it extremely doubtful
whether the courts could interfere.
But the real danger is that Congress may attempt to impose
a federal income tax upon interest received in the future on
outstanding state and municipal bonds. Indeed one academic
authority has urged that this be done, 57 admitting that it is unethical, but claiming that it is economically desirable.
The author is not prepared to argue against the economic
desirability of such a procedure, and, for reasons already stated,
he is still less inclined to attack its validity. He does feel, however, that such a procedure would be not merely unethical, but,
to use a blunter word, definitely dishonest. That governments can
be dishonest, and that there is little judicial remedy for governmental dishonesty has been demonstrated again and again, and
not merely in recent years. It is submitted therefore that temptation to such dishonesty should be removed by a constitutional
amendment definitely permitting state salaries to be taxed by
the federal government and federal salaries to be taxed by the
state governments from and after January 1, 1939, only; and
permitting the taxation of interest on state and municipal bonds
by the federal government only with respect to bonds issued
56. Internal Rev. Code (1939) 53 Stat. 10, sec. 22b (4).
57. Schultz, Tax Exemption of Government Securities (1939)

Mag. 331.

17 Tax
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after the adoption of the amendment, with a corresponding provision as to taxation by states of interest on federal bonds.
But the dangers of retroactivity, as real as they seem to be,
are not so great, nor so menacing, as the danger that the federal
government's power of taxation will be extended to state salaries
and securities, whereas the states' power of taxation will not be
correspondingly extended to federal salaries and securities. In
the discussion thus far, it has been assumed that the states and
the national government have been correspondingly limited in
their respective taxing powers by the intergovernmental doctrines, and that the extension of the federal taxing power to
reach state functions would necessarily involve a corresponding
extension of state taxing power to reach federal functions. However, an examination of the authorities shows that this assumption is by no means dependable or accurate.
It is obvious that constitutional grants to the federal government necessarily involve a corresponding diminution of the
sovereign power of the states.58 It may well be that this will
involve state taxing power as well as other functions. Nevertheless, one would naturally assume that whatever immunities from
state taxation are granted to the federal government would be
reflected in a corresponding immunity of state functions from
federal taxation; otherwise the federal government may be able
through the use of its taxing power to destroy the states.
The doctrine that the immunities of taxation are not mutual
but are primarily for the benefit of the federal government began, like many of the doctrines with regard to taxation in intergovernmental relations, with Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in M'Culloch v. Maryland 9 He argued that the federal taxing power was more extensive than that of the states, since when
Congress imposes a tax it acts upon its own constituents (which
include, of course, all the citizens of the states), whereas when
a state taxes in such a way as to affect the national government,
it is burdening others than its own constituents-to wit, citizens
of other states. This argument is certainly more theoretically
correct than justified by experience; and it was a pure dictum,
the case not in the least involving this question.60 Nevertheless,
58. United States v. California (1936) 297 U. S. 175.
59. (U. S. 1819) 4 Wheat. 316.
60. The state tax there invalidated was certainly unconstitutional, as
discriminating against federal agencies.
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it has had frequent, though indecisive, recognition by the Court,
and was so recognized even in the O'Keefe case, where the question whether Congress could, by explicit language, protect the
employees of this or any other federal governmental agency from
state taxation was explicitly reserved, the Court merely holding
that Congress had not sought to do so.
As already said, there appears to be little definite authority
in the decisions of the Supreme Court in favor of this theory.
61
Perhaps the decision in University of Illinois v. United States,
holding that the federal government can impose custom duties
upon articles imported by states for educational purposes, might
be regarded as an assertion of federal supremacy; but the Court
purports to rest upon the theory that custom duties are not a
tax but a regulation of commerce. This reasoning does not seem
impressive, but it at least prevents the case being cited as a
square authority for federal supremacy. Nevertheless, the assertion of such federal supremacy is occasionally made by federal
administrative officers ;62 and the overruling by the O'Keefe case
of Collector v. Day83 might possibly be regarded as an implied
argument in favor of judicial assertion of federal supremacy,
in view of the fact that that case definitely disapproved the doctrine, as is shown by the reliance on it in the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Bradley.
As against this very dubious assertion of such federal supremacy, at least as inherent and irrespective of congressional statutes, there are a number of court decisions which expressly or
by clear inference disregard Marshall's alleged distinction. An
excellent example of the usual attitude of the court is shown in
64
the following quotation from Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell:
But neither government may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial manner the exercise of its powers.
Hence, the limitation upon the taxing power of each, so far
as it affects the other, must receive a practical construction
which permits both to function with the minimum of interference each with the other; and that limitation cannot be
so varied or extended as seriously to impair either the taxing power of the government imposing the tax [citing
61. (1933) 289 U. S. 48.
62. See Shaw, Recent Cases on the Doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax
Immunity (1938) 8 Brooklyn L. Rev. 38.
63. (U. S. 1871) 11 Wall. 113.
64. (1926) 269 U. S. 514.
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cases] or the appropriate exercise of the functions of the
government affected by it. 5
There is similar language in Brush v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue," which, while probably overruled, has never been criticized on this basis. And in Willcuts v. Bunn, 7 holding that the
federal government may impose an income tax upon the profits
of sale of municipal bonds, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes remarked
that several states had filed briefs arguing for the validity of
such a tax, in order that they might severally have the power
to impose a similar tax upon profits from the sale of federal
bonds. The Court seems clearly to have recognized the propriety of the position taken by these states, and therefore to have
impliedly but rather definitely repudiated Marshall's contention.
If it were not then for the difference which arises, or seems to
arise, when Congress expressly claims such immunity, this doctrine might probably be safely dismissed.
As already indicated, the Court has very much limited the
immunity of the states and their agencies from federal taxation,
even in the days of fullest recognition of such immunity, by
decisions that it was not applicable to business as distinguished
from governmental activities of the states. While the possibility
of this limitation has long been recognized,"" it does not appear
to have been actually applied until the beginning of the present
century, when the Court held in South Carolinav. United States9
that a state was subject to the federal excise tax upon liquor used
in a state dispensary system which had a monopoly of liquor
distribution within the state. The Court conceded that this was
a lawful exercise of state powers, but insisted that it was not
strictly a governmental activity. The soundness of this contention is rendered somewhat questionable by a later decision 7°
holding that the same state could not be sued for liquor supplied
to it by the plaintiff for ise in the state dispensary, on the ground
that such a suit would be against the state, and so contrary to
the Eleventh Amendment. South Carolinav. United States must
65. 269 U. S. at 523, 524.
66. (1937) 300 U. S. 352.
67. (1931) 282 U. S. 216.
68. See United States v. Baltimore & 0. R. R. (U. S. 1873) 17 Wall.
322; Ambrosini v. United States (1902) 187 U. S. 1.
69. (1905) 199 U. S. 437.
70. Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co. (1909) 213 U. S. 151.
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rest primarily upon the argument that any other result would
unreasonably hamper the federal taxing power; but at any rate,
its doctrine is in good standing, having recently been reiterated
by the Court.71
The decision in Helvering v. Powers72 that trustees operating
an interurban railroad for a state, were subject to federal income tax upon their salaries rests upon similar grounds. Of
course, there would be no argument as to this case under the
O'Keefe decision; but the Powers case was decided when the
court assumed that salaries paid by a state to employees in
strictly governmental functions were exempt. The theory upon
which the decision rests is that the state was operating a private
business. While the operation of a railroad or other utility seems
to be less strictly a governmental function than a liquor monopoly
-which is clearly operated primarily for the protection of
public safety and morals-yet there seems an obvious impropriety in the state's carrying on a purely private business. It is
obvious that where a state validly operates a utility, it acts for
the public benefit, 73 and that here again the justification, if any,
of the federal tax is that otherwise there would be danger of too
great a limitation on the federal taxing power.
Perhaps this doctrine is best explained in the recent decision
of Allen v. Regents of the University System of Georgia,7 holding that a federal admission tax could be collected on admissions
to athletic contests of state universities. Here the Court conceded, as it clearly was compelled to, that education is a usual
and probably necessary state function, but it contends that athletic activities constitute a private business conducted in competition with private interests. Again the Court pointed out
that to prohibit the tax would unduly limit the federal taxing
power.
This is all very well so far as the federal taxation of state
activities is concerned; but does the rule work both ways? In
other words, do the states have the same power to tax the nongovernmental activities of the federal government that the latter
government has to tax the non-governmental activities of the
71.
72.
73.
a city
74.

Ohio v. Helvering (1934) 292 U. S. 360.
(1934) 293 U. S. 214.
See Brush v. Comm'r of Int. Rev. (1937) 300 U. S. 352, holding that
in operating a water system acts in a strictly governmental function.
(1938) 304 U. S. 439.
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states? This is simply another way of asking the question
whether there can be any constitutional activities of the federal
government which the Court will be willing to recognize as nongovernmental?
It is not easy to give a categorial answer to these questions,
especially in this period of radical change of supposedly fundamental constitutional doctrines with respect to this whole matter.7 5 Nevertheless, such data as we have indicates at least a
strong possibility that these questions are to be answered in the
negative, and therefore that there will be no such extension of
the state taxing power as has been given through this theory to
the federal taxing power. This is extremely important, since,
as has been shown, the only real justification for this extension
of the federal taxing power is its protection from destruction by
expanding state activities. If the states are deprived of the
same protection from the destruction of their taxing power
through expanding federal activities-which obviously no one
can contend is a mere theoretical danger at present-the state
taxing powers are in even greater danger. Certain it is, that
the Court has never subjected the federal government or its
agencies to state taxation upon the avowed theory that the particular federal activity concerned was non-governmental. This
is perhaps not completely decisive, since it could perhaps be said
that it is only comparatively recently that the federal government has engaged in activities which can reasonably be argued
to be non-governmental. But the Court has frequently used
language which has indicated that this problem was being considered by it, and that it was of the opinion that all valid federal
activity is necessarily governmental and therefore at least potentially free from state taxation. Thus in invalidating a state tax
upon property bought in by the federal government on sales for
delinquent federal taxes, the Court said "The United States do
not and cannot hold property, as a monarch may, for private or
personal purposes.17 6 Even more specifically, Mr. Justice Bradley in his dissenting opinion in Union Pacific R. R. v. Peniston,71
after quoting from the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in
M'Culloch v. Maryland,7T said:
75. See'Note (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1323.
76. Van Brocldin v. Tennessee (1886) 117 U. S.151, 158.
77. (U. S. 1873) 18 Wall. 5.
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The suggestion of Chief Justice Marshall in the above
quotation, that Congress cannot create any corporations
except for public and national purposes, is worthy of particular notice. The inference is obvious, that any corporation rightfully created by Congress, being necessarily public
and national in its object, is beyond the reach of State taxation. That suggestion, it is true, was made in reference
to a corporation established for business purposes within
the States of the Union. And in such a case, it is evident
that the proposition must be true, namely, that Congress
cannot create a corporation except for a public and national
purpose.79
The majority opinion in this case did not in any way controvert this language, but merely held that the railroad company,
whose immunity from state property tax was asserted on the
ground that it was an agent of the United States, was actually
subjected to state taxation by the applicable Congressional
statute.
In New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves0 the Court invalidated
a state income tax upon the general counsel of the Panama railroad, all the stock of which was owned by the government. The
railroad was operated by the government primarily in connection with the Panama Canal, but did a large amount of transportation business for private interests. It would seem that this
was a case which approached much nearer to ordinary commercial activity than the South Carolina liquor dispensary already
referred to."' Yet the Court held that the commercial business
of the railroad was purely incidental and that it must be regarded
as a governmental activity, so that its employees were wholly
exempt from state taxation on their salaries. Furthermore, the
overruling of this case by the O'Keefe case does not in an way
effect the force of the holding that the federal operation of the
road was a strictly governmental function.8 2 The inference
78. (U. S. 1819) 4 Wheat. 316.
79. (U. S. 1873) 18 Wall. 5, 43.
80. (1937) 299 U. S. 401.
81. South Carolina v. United States (1905) 199 U. S. 437, cited supra,
note 69.
82. It is stated that this case, and Collector v. Day (U. S. 1871) 11,
Wall. 113, "are overruled so far as they recognized an implied constitutional
immunity from income taxation of the salaries of officers and employees of
the national or a state government or their instrumentalities." (1939) 306
U. S.466, 486. Thus no point is made of any supposed difference in the
nature of federal functions.
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is permissible that all federal activities are at least potentially
governmental. 3
As has been stated, the Court does incline to construe against
immunity even of federal agencies from state taxation and other
state-imposed liabilities;", but there is a far stronger tendency
to hold that Congress may completely exempt all federal agencies (and even their securities and employees) from state taxation, at least so far as the agencies are engaged in governmental
activity-and this, in the light of the previous discussion, is a
condition which is probably always complied with.
The problem was early considered in connection with national
banks. Such banks were by federal statute exempted from all
state taxation except such as was explicitly permitted. The scope
of permitted state taxation has been somewhat extended in recent years; but the Court has steadily adhered to the idea that
the immunity is complete except where done away with by
express permission of Congress."5 Thus in the early case of
Van Allen v. The Assessors,8 6 where the Court sustained a state
tax on national banks because expressly permitted by Congress,
it reasoned as follows:
It is said that Congress possesses no power to confer upon
a State authority to be exercised which has been exclusively
delegated to that body by the Constitution, and, consequently, that it cannot confer upon a State the sovereign
right of taxation; nor is a State competent to receive a
grant of any such power from Congress. We agree to this.
But as it respects a subject-matter over which Congress and
the States may exercise a concurrent power, but from the
exercise of which Congress, by reason of its paramount
83. The language of Mr. Justice Stone in the O'Keefe case is pertinent
on this point, and seems to support this theory. He said: "As that [i. e. the
federal] government derives its authority wholly from powers delegated to
it by the Constitution, its every action within its constitutional power is
governmental action, and since Congress is made the sole judge of what
powers within the constitutional grant are to be exercised, all activities of
government constitutionally authorized by Congress must stand on a parity
with respect to their constitutional immunity from taxation." (1939) 306
U. S.466, 477. And see for a discussion of the extreme claims of immunity

from state taxation and of power to tax the states themselves, made in
behalf of the federal government, Tobin, Federal Taxation of State and
Local Bonds (1939) 17 Tax Mag. 621.
84. Federal Land Bank v. Priddy (1935) 295 U. S. 229. See also Alward
v. Johnson (1931) 282 U. S.509 holding that a state gross receipts tax may
be imposed upon receipts from carrying mails.
85. Owensboro Natl Bank v. Owensboro (1899) 173 U. S.664.
86. (U. S. 1866) 3 Wall. 573.
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authority, may exclude the States, there is no doubt Congress may withhold the exercise of that authority and leave
the States free to act. * * * The power of taxation under the
Constitution as a general rule, and as has been repeatedly
recognized in adjudged cases in this court, is a concurrent
power. The qualifications of the rule are the exclusion of the
States from the taxation of the means and instruments employed in the exercise of the functions of the Federal Government.87
The same rule has been applied to an island possession of the
United States in Domenech v. NationalCity Bank of New York,"
where the Court, in invalidating certain taxes imposed by Puerto
Rico on a branch of a national bank said with reference to taxation by United States possessions:
Like a state, though for a different reason, such an agency
may not tax a federal instrumentality. A state, though a
sovereign, is precluded from so doing because the Constitution requires that there be no interference by a state with
the powers granted to the federal government. A territory
or a possession may not do so because the dependency may
not tax its sovereign. True the Congress may consent to
such taxation; but the grant to the Island of a general power
to tax should not be construed as a consent.8 9
It seems clear therefore that the Court still adheres to its
position that the states have no power to tax national banks,
their securities or their employees, except with the permission
of Congress. The same rule has been applied to the securities of
banks organizd under the Federal Farm Loan Act.90 And the
Court has gone so far as to sustain the congressional exemption
of United States notes from state taxation, though admitting
that these notes were equivalent in economic effect to money,
and further admitting that there was no doubt of the power
of the states to tax ordinary currency 1
2 the Court sustained a
In Federal Land Bank v. Crosland"
federal statute providing that mortgages to federal land banks
are exempt from taxation by the states, and applied it so as to
invalidate a state recording tax with respect to such mortgages.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

3 Wall. 585.
(1935) 294 U. S. 199.
294 U. S. 205.
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co. (1921) 255 U. S. 180.
Bank v. Supervisors (U. S. 1869) 7 Wall. 26.
(1923) 261 U. S. 374
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This doctrine was reiterated as to the Home Owners' Loan Corporation in Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corporation," decided in November, 1939, several months after the decision in
the O'Keefe case. The Court pointed out, what has already been
stated here, that the O'Keefe case explicitly reserved the question of the power of Congress to exempt employees of this corporation from state income taxes, and was so decided only because Congress had not exercised this power. As respects mortgages to federal land banks and the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, the Congressional power of exemption had been exercised, and the Court again directly held that such an exemption
is entirely within the power of Congress. Accordingly there
appears to be no reason why Congress cannot exempt all federal
agencies, their employees, and their securities, from state taxation.
Furthermore, such extension of federal exemption has been
by no means unheard of in the past-including the rather immediate past. The most striking example appears in connection
with the decision of Baltimore National Bank v. State Tax Commission of Maryland.- This case decided that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was clearly a federal agency, but it
further held that express subjection by Congress of national
bank stock to state taxation included all such stock by whomsoever held. However, since the Court conceded that its holdings
could be exempted from state taxation, Congress promptly passed
a statute" exempting national bank stock held by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation from state taxation, thereby extending
the exemption beyond that decided by the Court to already exist;
and the validity of this statute seems indisputable.
The result is that there is at least a strong argument that
Congress has power to wholly exempt all federal agencies, their
securities, and their employees, from state taxation. While it
does not seem probable that Congress will, at least immediately,
exercise this power to the full, past Congressional practice indicates that it will be availed of to a considerable, and perhaps to
an alarming, extent.98 And on the other hand, the present point
93.
94.
95.
96.
1939)

(1939) 60 S.Ct. 15.
(1936) 297 U. S. 209.
(1936) 49 Stat. 1185, c. 160, 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 51d.
See United States v. Board of Commissioners (D. C. N. D. Okla.
26 F. Supp. 270.
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of view of the Supreme Court is to invalidate any attempt by
the states to exempt from federal taxation even direct state
activities, at least so far as they are what is regarded as nongovernmental, and their employees and possibly securities even
when the activities are strictly governmental.97 To be sure, it
seems probable that the federal government cannot in taxing
such state functions formally discriminate against the states;
that it to say, the tax upon the states and their agencies cannot
be at a higher rate than that applicable to private interests
engaged in comparable activities. But this protection against
discrimination is largely nugatory if, as seems to be the case,
the federal government can completely exempt its own instrumentalities. It is not solely a matter of fairness; it is a matter
which involves the efficiency of state action, and indeed the very
existence of the states. Subjection of state activities to federal
taxation coupled with federal immunity from state taxation, if
it is carried to the full and lasts long enough, would mean such
limitation of state taxing power as to make it impossible for
state governments to continue. All of the recent activity of the
Supreme Court to extend state taxing power by permitted multiple taxation will not save them, 9 particularly as such multiple
taxation can for the most part be readily avoided by taxpayers.
This is an impasse from which it appears that only a constitutional amendment can save us. It is submitted therefore that a
constitutional amendment is needed, not to subject state activities to non-discriminatory federal taxation, for this seems to be
the law now and probably should be, but rather to prohibit the
federal government from exempting its own agencies, employees,
and securities from non-discriminatory state taxation. Whatever theoretical justification there may be for federal supremacy
must give way to its practical incompatibility with the continued
activities and even existence of the states.
97. See Stokes, State Taxation and the New Federal Instrumentalities
(1986) 22 Iowa L. Rev. 39; Freedman, Government-owned Corporations and
Intergovernmental Tax Immunity (1938) 24 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY 43. An excellent argument (but of questionable validity)
against the power of Congress wholly to exempt federal corporations and
their securities from state taxation is Walsh, Taxation of Governmental
Corporations Engaged in Business Within the States (1939) 17 Tax Mag.
570.
98. See Curry v. McCanless (1939) 307 U. S. 357; Graves v. Elliott
(1939) 307 U. S.383.
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One other problem remains in the matter of governmental
taxation; and this problem is becoming extremely insistent in
this period of extending federal activities. This is the problem
of property taxes.
At first sight, it may seem that there is actually no problem
of the relation between the states and nation as respects this
form of taxation. This is because the federal government has
practically no power to impose property taxes at all. The reason
is that a property tax is a direct tax and must be apportioned
according to population;99 a requirement which is practically
impossible to comply with.10
It would seem then that since the federal government has
really no power to impose property taxes, whereas the states
have virtually unlimited power to impose them, there is no
unfairness to the states in being compelled to exempt the
property of the federal government and its agencies from state
taxation. It may thus be urged that this exemption is only a
partial one, whereas the exemption from federal taxation is
substantially total. The answer that the limitation inheres in
the constitutional powers of the federal government rather than
as an aspect of intergovernmental relations, does not seem very
convincing. But when one looks at the actual facts as to how
this exemption of federal property is working, he is forced to
conclude that it is in fact an even more serious menace to effective state government than the possibility of exemption of federal agencies from state taxation of other forms, which has
already been discussed.
There can be no question that property of the United States
government is entirely exempt from state taxation of any sort. 101
The rule applies irrespective of any Congressional statute; indeed
there might be some question as to whether such property could
be subjected to state taxation even with the express consent of
Congress. 02 Where the property is owned by private interests,
99. See U. S. Const. Art. I, sec. 2, par. 3; Art. I, see. 9, par. 4.
100. During the Civil War and Reconstruction Period, this limitation
seems to have been partly evaded in the South. See Van Brocklin v.
Tennessee (1886) 117 U. S. 151. It is probable that such a "tax," if sustainable at all, must rest on the war rather than the taxing power.
101. McGoon v. Scales (U. S. 1870) 9 Wall. 23; Van Brocklin v. Tennessee (1886) 117 U. S.151.
102. But cf. the quotation from Van Allen v. The Assessors (U. S. 1866)
3 Wall. 573, cited note 87, supra.
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but the United States has a lien or other security interest in the
property, the property is taxable, but the taxes cannot be a lien
upon the interest of the federal government. 10 3 Even where
the property is being retained by the federal government after
its own use of the property has been abandoned, and is being
leased to private interests, the immunity from state taxation
still continues 1 0 '
As to Indian lands, where the federal title, if still maintained,
is merely for the protection of the Indians, the rules are not
so rigid. It seems clear that such property is not necessarily
exempt from federal taxation, in the absence of express provision in a federal statute providing for such exemption.10 5 The
Court has frequently pointed out that states having a large
Indian population would be distinctly embarrassed by having
all such property non-taxable; and accordingly has tended to
construe federal statutes according such exemption rather
strictly. 106 Nevertheless, there is no doubt of the power of Congress to fully exempt Indian land and other property from federal taxation; and such power is occasionally still exerted. 10 7
Still less rigid is the rule as to immunity of agents of the
United States from the burden of property taxation. This problem arose many times in connection with the property of transcontinental railroads, which were constructed with government
subsidies, and might well be regarded, at least for some purposes, as federal government agencies.
The court early took the position that the property of such
agencies was not exempt from federal taxation in the absence
of express Congressional statutes. The reasoning of the court
is very similar to that with respect to Indian property and is
well shown in the following quotation from an early case:108
We perceive no limits to the principle of exemption which
the complainants seek to establish. It would remove from
the reach of State taxation all the property of every agent
103. Forbes v. Gracey (1877) 94 U. S. 762.
104. Springfield v. United States (C. C. A. 1, 1938) 99 F. (2d) 860,
cert. den. (1939) 306 U. S. 650.
105. Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp. (1928) 276 U. S. 575.
106. See Brown, The Taxation of Indian Property (1931) 15 Minn. L.
Rev. 182.
107. United States v. Board of Commissioners (D. C. N. D. Okla., 1939)
26 F. Supp. 270.
108. Thomson v. Union Pac. R. R. (U. S. 1870) 9 Wall. 579.
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of the government. Every corporation engaged in the transportation of mails, or of government property of any description, by land or water, or in supplying materials for
the use of the government, or in performing any service of
whatever kind, might claim the benefit of the exemption.
The amount of property now held by such corporations, and
having relations more or less direct to the National government and its service, is very great. And this amount is
continually increasing; so that it may admit of question
whether the whole income of the property which will remain
liable to State taxation, if the principle contended for is
admitted and applied in its fullest extent, may not ultimately
be found
inadequate to the support of the State govern09
ments.2

The same rule applied even though the railroad corporation
was formed under a federal statute rather than under state
law.110
Even though federal property has not yet been conveyed to
the railroad corporation, but the railroad has completely fulfilled
the conditions under which the land has been promised to it, the
land is subject to state taxation. The title of the United States
under these conditions is a bare legal title.211 If, however, the
government has some interest in the property, even though it
has been already conveyed to the railroad, the government's
interest is non-taxable and cannot be affected by the lien of
delinquent taxes on the interest of the railroad. 12 2 The same
rules have been applied to homestead land, where the homesteader had rceived a conveyance, but had not yet fulfilled the
conditions necessary for receiving an absolute title.1 3 And it has
been held that where the United States Housing Corporation, a
wholly owned federal agency, had sold residence property to
private individuals, and these individuals were entitled to a
deed, such property was subject to city taxes; but the lien of
such taxes could not affect or encumber the right of the governmental agency to recover the balance of the purchase price.114
Several cases just cited indicate that property taxes on gov109. 9 Wall. at 591, 592. As will presently appear, this language is even
more apposite to present conditions than to those when the decision was
rendered.
110. Union Pac. R. R. v. Peniston (U. S. 1873) 18 Wall. 5.
111. Tucker v. Ferguson (U. S. 1875) 22 Wall. 527.
112. Wisconsin Cent. R. R. v. Price County (1890) 133 U. S. 496.
113. Irwin v. Wright (1922) 258 U. S. 219.
114. New Brunswick v. United States (1928) 276 U. S. 547.
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ernmental agencies may be sustained in so far as they burden
only private interests, including individual investors in such
agencies; but they are not sustained when they are a direct
burden upon the federal agency itself.11 5 Perhaps this is not an
invariable rule, at least in the absence of an express provision
in a federal statute. But the court has held that a tax upon the
property of a governmental agency which is regarded as a
mere instrumentality of the government itself is invalid even
without express Congressional claim of exemption.11 6 The court
suggested that a mere agent might not perhaps be entitled to
such an absolute exemption.
The distinction between an "instrumentality" and a "mere
agent" is obviously somewhat tenuous. Perhaps it might give
some hope of sustaining such a distinction between governmental
and non-governmental purposes as has been used to limit state
exemption from federal taxation; but this seems rather improbable.217 Certain it is that the Court has hitherto held, with
apparent invariability, that any agent of the United States may
be wholly exempted by Congress from state taxes of any sort,
including property taxes." 8 This doctrine has been emphatically
W 9 the opinion in which exreiterated by the Court in a decision
pressly considers the O'Keefe case and holds that it has not
changed the old rule.
Furthermore, Congress has been expanding the scope of this
property tax immunity almost as rapidly as it has been expanding federal instrumentalities in the past few years. Recent Congresses have apparently almost lost sight of the embarrassment
to the states in heavy losses of their taxing power through the
acquisition by such agencies of the large amounts of their
property. A conspicuous example is the Tennessee Valley Authority which has well-nigh wiped out taxable property in large
115. See cases cited in notes 112-114, supra.
116. Clallam County v. United States (1923) 263 U. S. 341.
117. No distinction of this sort seems to be made as to independent contractors, James v. Dravo Contracting Co. (1937) 302 U. S. 134.
118. The suggestion by Freedman, Government-owned Corporations and
Intergovernmental Tax Immunity (1938) 24 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QuARTERLY 46, that the states could tax bonds of the federal government and its agencies as property, seems very doubtful, even under existing
law. At any rate such bonds are usually explicitly exempted from state
taxation, and will no doubt continue to be.
119. Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp. (1939) 60 S. Ct. 15, following
Federal Land Bank v. Crosland (1923) 261 U. S. 374.
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areas in eastern Tennessee and adjoining states where its operations are carried on, even in one or two cases taking practically
entire counties.1 20 The United States Housing Authority has
deliberately encouraged many cities to give up their taxing
powers on new dwellings, in consideration of grants from it;
an exchange which is submitted to be shortsighted, and may well
turn out to be ruinous.
These examples are conspicuous, but are by no means the
whole story. The present position of the federal government
apparently is that all such property of federal agencies is necessarily, and without express Congressional provision, exempt from
state taxation.12 ' Whether this is so or not seems of little importance, if such exemption can be obtained by Congressional
provision therefor; since such provisions are usual and if accidentally omitted can probably readily be obtained.
The question as to property taxes thus comes ultimately to
pretty much the same problem as to other forms of state taxation; that is to say, can Congress wholly exempt itself and its
agents from the burden of such taxes? The only difference is
that the danger of exemption from other forms of taxation, while
undoubtedly very real, has not yet done much actual harm; the
exemption from property taxes is already embarrassing and is
in some instances almost completely wiping out property taxation in some localities. This is a situation which demands an
immediate remedy, and a constitutional amendment seems to be
the only solution.
It may be urged that the states and their local agencies have
depended too much upon property taxes, and should develop
other forms. This is undoubtedly true; but states and localities
must at best continue to depend quite largely upon the property
tax, since this is the only tax which is not subject to the competition of the federal government. Furthermore, there is no assurance that any other form of tax will be any safer from being
injured by federal immunity than is the property tax.
In his concurring opinion in the O'Keefe case, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter suggested that the question whether Congress could
120. See the New York Times, Dec. 5, 1939, p. 30.
121. See the summary of the report of the Conference on State Defense
in (1939) 24 Bull. of Nat'l Tax Ass'n 102. See also, Tobin, Federal Taxation of State and Local Bonds (1939) 17 Tax Mag. 621.
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give the total exemption to its "functionaries," denied in that
case because of the absence of an express statutory provision,
"is matter for another day."' 22 It is suggested, however, that
1 23
the court has in Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corporation,
already reached that other day and answered the question. Even
if this is not so, it still appears that there is every probability
that the Court will answer the question in the way suggested
by that case, and will hold that Congress may exempt its "functionaries," individual or otherwise, from all forms of state taxation. Furthermore, it is evident that Congress in its present
mood, is not unlikely to exercise this power to an extent which,
while probably not complete, will be sufficient to ruin state activity. If this is accomplished, no efforts to preserve the states
will be successful; for a government without taxing power cannot govern, and (since government must go on) the function
will necessarily be taken over by the national government.
CONCLUSION

It must be concluded that a constitutional amendment is unnecessary if Congress could be depended on to maintain a reasonable equivalency between federal and state taxing power. But
Congress cannot be depended on for this; in fact we have some
rather menacing situations already. As it now stands, the Supreme Court has (probably wisely) taken away most, if not all,
of the implied tax immunities of both states and nation; but it
seems unable, at least under any doctrine which has yet appeared, to prevent the destruction of state taxing power by
federal immunities expressly provided for and which are no
longer available to the states.
It must be conceded that the drafting of a constitutional
amendment to cover this situation would be extremely difficult.' 24
However, this is all the more reason why work on this task
should be begun very promptly. The longer we wait, the more
serious the situation is likely to become, and the poorer the
chance of saving effective state taxing power.
It is submitted that the proposed constitutional amendment
should cover three separate points, as follows:
122. (1939) 306 U. S. 466, 492.
123. (1939) 60 S. Ct. 15. See discussion of this case supra, p. 179.
124. See Shaw, Recent Cases on the Doctrine of Intergovernmental Tax
Immunity (1938) 8 Brooklyn L. Rev. 38.
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(1) prevention of retroactivity;
(2) definite permission to the states to impose non-discriminatory taxes on the activities and securities of the federal government and its agents and the salaries paid by them; and similar
permission to the federal government to tax state operations,
securities and salaries; and
(3) permission to the state to impose non-discriminatory
property taxes upon the property of the federal government and
its agents.
The problem of retroactivity is concerned mostly with the
income tax, and, as already said, is probably not serious enough
of itself to justify a constitutional amendment. However, if,
as seems probable, a constitutional amendment is necessary to
handle other aspects of this problem, the amendment should
certainly cover this point. It should be so drafted as to prevent
federal income taxes upon salaries paid by the states and their
agencies for periods prior to 1939, and should prevent the taxation of interest on securities of states and their local subdivisions,
except those issued subsequent to the date of coming into effect
of the amendment. The states should be similarly restricted as
to activities, salaries and securities of the federal government
and its agencies.
The second matter with which the amendment should deal is
closely connected with the first, and may undoubtedly be covered
in the same paragraph with it; but it is actually more fundamental. An interesting suggestion 125 has recently been made that
the proposed amendment be restricted to income taxes, and be
drawn in such a way that all taxes collected by the states with
respect to federal salaries and securities be returned to the federal treasury. Similarly, all taxes collected by the federal government with respect to state salaries and securities be returned
by that government to the respective state treasuries.
There is much to be said for this suggestion. It would certainly prevent any undue burdening of the states, as seems possible under the present situation. But the author of this suggestion admits that it would give rise to serious difficulties in administration, in view of the differences in rates of tax, and the problems of segregation of taxes to be returned as distinguished from
those which are to be kept, where, as frequently happens, a particular taxpayer would have a substantial amount of both kinds
125. See Bennett, Income Tax Immunities (1939) 17 Tax Mag. 451.
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of income. Furthermore, it would not cover the problem of excise
taxes, which are rapidly increasing in importance. It is submitted, therefore, that the more simple solution previously outlined would be preferable. Any attempt by a state to discriminate against federal activities or of the federal government to
discriminate against the states would readily be invalidated by
the courts even at present; though express provision against discriminatory taxation should undoubtedly be included in the
amendment. The real purpose of the amendment is to take away
from Congress the power which it apparently now has to exempt
federal activities, employees and securities from state taxation.
Perhaps the suggestion that the states should be permitted to
tax federal operations may seem a bit startling. It is noticeable,
however, that the federal government already claims the right
to tax state operations, at least so far as the income tax is concerned.126 But this problem can perhaps best be considered in
connection with the next item which it is contended that the proposed constitutional amendment should cover.
This is the proposition that the states should be permitted to
impose a non-discriminatory tax upon the property of the federal government and its agencies. This is not only startling,
but, as already admitted, is subject to the theoretical objection
that since the federal government has no power to impose any
property taxes at all, it would be unfair to it to subject its
property to state taxation.
Nevertheless the position is adhered to that such permission
of the states to tax federal property would be conducive to actual
equality. No one will seriously contend that the federal taxing
power is at present unduly limited. If it is, and a property tax
is needed, the constitution can be amended on this point, and
such an amendment would include power to tax state property.
But the federal government seems to be getting along very well
(at least so far as raising revenue is concerned) without the
power to impose a property tax.
On the other hand, the states and their subdivisions are, and
must necessarily be, largely dependent upon the property tax.
And the power to lay that tax is not merely menaced, but in
many localities largely wiped out, by enormous acquisitions of
property by agencies of the federal government, in connection
126. See Tobin, Federal Taxation of State and Local Bonds (1939) 17
Tax Mag. 621.
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with some of its latest excursions into functions previously regarded as non-governmental. As already pointed out, unless
this destruction of state property taxing power is soon checked,
local government will completely break down in many areas, and
the states themselves will gradually lose the power of operating.
It may still be argued that this power of the states to tax
federal property should be limited to property used in functions
not admittedly governmental, and should not include such as is
used for traditionally federal purposes, such as post-offices, courthouses, military and naval purposes, and others. No doubt there
is a reasonable distinction on this ground. It is submitted, however, that any attempt to draft the amendment so as to make
this distinction would lead to an insuperable problem of both
language and administration. What are traditionally federal
functions and what are not is a matter as to which there would
be almost as many opinions as the people considering the question; and the burden upon the courts, which would ultimately
have to decide such problems, would be almost impossible. Where
the property is non-income producing, the property tax burden
would not usually be extremely heavy, since the market value
of such property would seldom be very great; and where the
property earns income, there seems no reason why the federal
government should be exempt from the burden of taxes imposed upon private business interests.
It is believed that the steps which the Court has taken to do
away with tax immunities in intergovernmental relations are
desirable and that no such immunities should exist, provided, of
course, that discriminatory taxation should not be permitted.
But it seems clear that fairness requires that such changes
should not be retroactive. More important, the present situation
gives a power to the federal government to retain and even
extend the exemption which it has previously enjoyed with respect to state taxation, and thus destroy that equality which the
doing away with intergovernmental immunity was supposed to
effectuate. Worse still, such a tendency, if unchecked, would
ultimately result in the destruction of the state and local governments. If these latter are worth preserving, they are certainly
worth the trouble of drafting and putting through a constitutional amendment; this is the only method by which they can
certainly, or even probably, be saved from the growing and ultimately destructive effect of federal immunity from taxation.

